We introduce a game in preference form, which consists of a game form and a preference structure, and define preference rationalizability that allows for each player's ex-post preferences over outcomes to depend on opponents' actions. We show that preference rationalizability is invariant to redundant types and states as long as all players have simplex restrictions on their ex-post preferences. We analyze the relationship between preference-form games and conventional payoff-form games. In particular, even if all players have simplex restrictions, we argue that there are multiple payoff-form games that correspond to a given preference-form game, and show that only one of them has the set of interim correlated rationalizable actions equal to the set of preference rationalizable actions in the preference-form game. We also discuss cases where the simplex assumption is violated.
Introduction
Since the ordinalist revolution of the 1930's, economists have generally taken preferences to be the primitive object of analysis in consumer choice, with utility functions being understood as convenient tools to represent preferences. In game theoretic analysis, it has been conventional since von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) to represent a game in "payoff form", where action profiles are associated with "payoffs" or "utilities" that players receive. This is usually understood to be a reduced-form model of a situation where action profiles give rise to outcomes and players' preferences over (lotteries over) outcomes can be represented using the payoffs/utilities. However, we will argue that this reduced-form representation causes confusion for foundational questions such as defining solution concepts. For this reason, we introduce a class of games in "preference form", which consist of a "game form", mapping action profiles into outcomes, and a "preference structure", specifying players' expected-utility preferences. We characterize the implications of common certainty of rationality in this setting and show that it corresponds to a solution concept that we label "preference rationalizability". We show how preference-form games can be mapped into standard payoff-form games by the introduction of appropriate state spaces. However, we show that while preference rationalizability is not sensitive to the choice of state space in the model (and thus captures common certainty of rationality independent of the state space), standard definitions of rationalizability, i.e. correlated rationalizability (Brandenburger and Dekel (1987) ) for complete-information game and interim correlated rationalizability (Dekel, Fudenberg and Morris (2007) ) for incomplete-information games, are sensitive in the payoff-form formulation.
The following example will be used to motivate preference-form games and our definition of preference rationalizability. Consider a setting with two players, Ann and Bob, and three possible outcomes, go to an old (known) restaurant (z old ), try a new one (z new ) or stay at home (z stay ). 1 Suppose that we (the modelers) know that both players happen to have the same expected-utility preferences over lotteries: they strictly prefer to go to the new restaurant to the old restaurant and strictly prefer either restaurant to staying at home. More specifically, they are each indifferent between (i) the old restaurant and (ii) a lottery consisting of 4/5 chance of going to the new restaurant and a 1/5 chance of staying at home. We can summarize these preferences by saying that they have utility indices (12, 15, 0) over the three outcomes (z old , z new , z stay ). 2 While we are certain of the players' preferences over lotteries (i.e., what they would choose if given a choice among lotteries), we do not believe that we know the players' "true" preferences, i.e., their preferences in all contingencies we could imagine. Let us suppose that we believe that contingent on all possibilities we are prepared to allow for, each player strictly prefers the old restaurant to staying at home, weakly prefers the new restaurant to staying at home and weakly prefers the old restaurant to the lottery consisting of a 1/10 chance of going to the new restaurant and a 9/10 chance of staying at home. Thus there are upper and lower bounds on how good or bad the new restaurant could be.
We can summarize these preferences by saying that each player has ex-post preferences that can be represented by utility indices that are a convex combination of (12, 120, 0) and (12, 0, 0) . While we are sure that Ann and Bob have the same unconditional preferences, we are not sure that they have the same ex-post preferences. Now suppose that the players face the following strategic environment: if both say "yes", they go to the new restaurant for sure; if both say "no", they go to the old one; if one says "yes" and 1 Outcome zstay does not play a substantive role in the discussion in the introduction but will be needed to conform with our general setup in Section 2, where we exclude completely indifferent ex-post preferences.
2 Utility indices are determined only up to affine transformations and the choice of utility indices in the introduction is for expository convenience, i.e., to avoid fractions later.
one says "no", there is a 2/3 chance they will end up going to the new restaurant and 1/3 to the old restaurant. The following 
where rows correspond to Ann's action, columns correspond to Bob's action and the entries in the table represent lotteries over the outcomes.
We just defined an example of a preference-form game by specifying a preference structure (in the paragraph before the previous one) describing what is known about players' preferences over outcomes; and game form (in the previous paragraph and summarized in table (1)). Since the new restaurant is strictly preferred to the old, saying "yes" seems like a dominant strategy for, say, Ann.
However, we will argue that if Ann is unsure if Bob will say "yes" or "no", then action "no" is also consistent with common certainty of rationality. To see why, observe that choosing an action for
Ann is equivalent to choosing an (Anscombe-Aumann) act that maps actions of Bob to lotteries over outcomes. Thus saying "yes" is equivalent to going to the new restaurant for sure if Bob says "yes", and with only probability 2/3 if Bob says "no"; saying "no" is equivalent to going to the new restaurant with probability 2/3 if Bob says "yes", and going to the old restaurant if Bob says "no".
The preference structure did not pin down Ann's preferences over such acts. In particular, suppose that Ann assigned probability 1/2 to Bob saying "yes" and her ex-post preferences being represented by (12, 30, 0) , and probability 1/2 to Bob saying "no" and her ex-post preferences being represented by (12, 0, 0) . In this case, the expected payoff to saying "yes" would be (30 + 1/3 × 12)/2 = 17, while the payoff to saying "no" would be (2/3 × 30 + 1/3 × 12 + 12)/2 = 18. By symmetry, each action is then consistent with common certainty of rationality and thus preference rationalizable in the sense that we will define it.
While it is important to our approach that ex-post preferences are not pinned down by the preference structure, we do impose restrictions on ex-post preferences. In the above example, recall that we made assumptions that ex-post preferences are represented by convex combinations of utility indices (12, 120, 0) and (12, 0, 0) . It turns out that if we impose no restriction on ex-post preferences, then our framework and solution concept behave quite badly. For the first half of the paper, we therefore focus on a well-behaved class of "simplex" restrictions on ex-post preferences.
We impose the requirement that the set of ex-post preferences are represented by the convex hull of a finite set of independent utility indices on outcomes. Note that our example satisfies this restriction. In the second half of the paper, we examine what happens as the simplex restrictions are relaxed.
A key feature of the above example and our analysis in general is that while we make assumptions about players' (perhaps interdependent) preferences over lotteries, we assume that these do not pin down all possible ex-post preferences. An alternative response would be to assume a rich set of incomplete-information states, as in Harsanyi (1967/68) , and assume that ex-post preferences are pinned down by a sufficiently rich state space. There are two reasons why we prefer not to go down this route. First, we do not think that the modeler will know how to specify the state space.
If states reflect outcome uncertainty (i.e., different states give rise to distinct outcomes), we can imagine that states are in principle observable. But to the extent that the uncertainty is about preferences over fixed physical outcomes, it is not clear that states have an observable counterpart.
Second, we believe our modelling choice follows a long and productive "small worlds" modelling strategy in the literature on the epistemic foundations of game theory: Savage (1954) argued that states (in his single person decision theory) should not be interpreted as being exhaustive and this view has been widely adopted in giving decision theoretic foundations to game theoretic analysis.
Thus Aumann (1987) made an influential argument that correlation between the actions of two players in a third player's mind...
....has no connection with any overt or even covert collusion between 1 and 2; they may be acting entirely independently. Thus it may be common knowledge that both 1 and 2 went to business school, or perhaps to the same business school; but 3 may not know what is taught there. In that case 3 would think it quite likely that they would take similar actions, without being able to guess what those actions might be. 3 Aumann was not proposing that we should explicitly include the possibility that 1 and 2 attended the same business school in our description of states. Rather, he was arguing that there might be a richer structure behind his small worlds model of correlated equilibrium. Similarly, we can imagine that there is some reason why Bob saying "yes" is correlated in Ann's mind with a more desirable experience at the new restaurant but we do not know how to model it. To allow Aumann's unmodelled correlation and not allow our correlation of actions with preferences seems inconsistent.
Nonetheless, the "payoff-form" framework is standard and it is natural to ask if our richer framework is needed or if there is an appropriate way of embedding our analysis in the standard framework. We investigate this issue in detail. Under simplex restrictions, we argue that there are two natural ways to represent an arbitrary preference-form game by a payoff-form game. We can illustrate these two representations with our example. One representation is a complete-information .
In this class of payoff-form games with incomplete information, Dekel, Fudenberg and Morris (2007) argued that interim correlated rationalizability is the solution concept that reflects common certainty of rationality. Both actions are interim correlated rationalizable in the example. In general,
we show that the set of (Bayes-Nash) equilibria are the same in the preference-form game and its minimal (i.e., the former) and expansive (i.e., the latter) payoff-form versions, but that the set of preference-rationalizable actions equals the set of interim correlated rationalizable actions in the expansive payoff-form representation only, and includes (strictly in some games) the set of interim correlated rationalizable actions in the minimal payoff-form representation. Thus if we stick to the payoff-form formulation, interim correlated rationalizability characterizes the behavioral implications of common certainty of rationality and beliefs and higher-order beliefs over the (exogenously given) state space, but does not provide an operational definition of the state space. We show that if we assume simplex restrictions on ex-post preferences, we can use those restrictions to define the unique state-space representation under which interim correlated rationalizable actions coincide with preference rationalizable actions.
In the second half of the paper, we examine what happens to our analysis if we relax the simplex assumption. If we relax this assumption slightly and allow for non-simplex convex polytope restrictions, then preference rationalizability may not be invariant to redundant types or states, nor may it be equivalent to interim correlated rationalizability in any corresponding payoff-form game.
Moreover, if we drop such restrictions and allow for any state-dependent utility indices, then preference rationalizability becomes oddly behaved. For example, the set of preference rationalizable actions may not be upper hemicontinuous with respect to slight changes in game forms. Also, the iteration procedure always stops in one step, and hence preference rationalizability depends only on preferences over outcomes ("first-order preference"), and is independent of how these preferences depend on each other's type ("higher-order preferences"). This is in sharp contrast to Bergemann, Morris and Takahashi (2011), where we show that if ex-post utility indices are restricted to a bounded set, then there exists a game form in which two types have disjoint sets of preference rationalizable actions if and only if they have different hierarchies of preferences (preferences and higher-order preferences) over outcomes. 4 In the example we presented, the preference structure was degenerate with each player having one possible type so that there was common certainty of preferences over lotteries. Our main results allow for rich structures of interdependent preferences, where players have a set of types and each type has expected-utility preferences over Anscombe-Aumann acts over the other players' types.
A companion paper, Bergemann, Morris and Takahashi (2011), identifies a canonical space of all relevant interdependent preferencesà la Mertens and Zamir (1985) , and shows how they can be observationally distinguished. In this sense, we allow for arbitrary preference uncertainty in our framework. Our main results focus on the case where there is no outcome uncertainty, so that there is common certainty of the mapping from action profiles to lotteries over outcomes. However, we also discuss how to incorporate outcome uncertainty into the analysis.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces decision-theoretic notations to discuss preferences represented by state-dependent utility indices. Section 3 defines preferenceform games and preference rationalizability as a solution concept. Section 4 discusses relationships between preference rationalizability in preference-form games and interim correlated rationalizability in payoff-form games. Section 5 discusses cases with non-simplex restrictions on ex-post utility indices. Section 6 concludes.
State-Dependent Utilities
Throughout the paper, we consider expected-utility preferences over Anscombe-Aumann acts. In this section, we provide notations for a single decision-maker, which will be incorporated to strategic environments in the next section.
Let Z be a finite set of outcomes with |Z| ≥ 2. We say that U is a restriction on state-dependent utility indices if U is a non-empty convex subset of R Z such that (A) no u ∈ U is constant, and (B) for any u, v ∈ U , if there exist α > 0 and β ∈ R such that v(z) = αu(z) + β for any z ∈ Z, then u = v. A restriction U is a simplex if (C) U is equal to the convex hull of a finite set Fix a non-empty finite state space X, and let F (X) be the set of all (Anscombe-Aumann) acts f : X → ∆(Z). Given X and any restriction U on utility indices, let P U (X) be the set of preferences over F (X) that are represented by state-dependent utility indices that belong to U , i.e., the set of preferences over F (X) such that, for some q ∈ ∆(X) and
A state x is -null if is indifferent among outcomes contingent on x, or equivalently, q(x) = 0.
By Properties (A) and (B) of U , q and u(· | x) are uniquely determined up to -null states. For -non-null state x, we can define the conditional preference x over ∆(Z), which is represented by
Note that the decision-maker's subjective belief q over X depends on cardinal utility representations in U . However, P U (X) is independent of cardinal utility representations. That is, for two
Thus P U (X) corresponds to a set of preferences independent of representation with probabilities and cardinal utilities. For ease of exposition, however, we will sometimes refer to probabilities and cardinal utilities.
Note also that, given simplex restriction U , P U (X) is isomorphic to ∆(X ×ext U ). 6 It is because each ∈ P (X) is represented by q ∈ ∆(X) and {u(· | x)} x∈X ⊂ U uniquely up to -null states x, and each u(· | x) is expressed as a convex combination of ext U uniquely.
We have the following examples of P U (X): Examples 1-4 for simplex restrictions, and Example 5 for a non-simplex restriction.
Example 1 (state independence). Let U = {u} with non-constant u ∈ R Z . Then P U (X) is the set of preferences with state-independent utility index u. Each ∈ P U (X) is then represented by q ∈ ∆(X).
5 For a subset X ⊆ R Z , conv X denotes the convex hull of X. 6 For a convex subset X ⊆ R Z , ext X denotes the set of extreme points of X.
Example 2 (ordinal monotonicity). For Z = {z 1 , . . . , z m }, let U = conv{u 2 , . . . , u m }, where
That is, P U (X) is the set of preferences such that the conditional preference x satisfies z m x z m−1 x · · · x z 1 for all x, and z m x z 1 for some (non-null) x. 7
Example 3 (worst outcome). For Z = {z 1 , . . . , z m }, let U = conv{u 2 , . . . , u m }, where
is the set of preferences such that the conditional preference x satisfies z x z 1 for all (x, z), and z x z 1 for some (x, z). 8
That is, P U (X) is the set of preferences such that there exists a non-null ordinal efficiency in the random assignment problem. 8 This restriction is adopted in Bergemann, Morris and Takahashi (2011). 9 The normalization based on these utility indices is in the spirit of quasi-linear utilities, where the probability difference between z1 and z2 is used as a numeraire. That is, each outcome z = z1, z2 is evaluated by how many percentage points of z2 versus z1 the decision-maker is willing to give up in order to increase one percentage point of the outcome z versus z1.
state, and for every such non-null state x, the conditional preference x satisfies z 2 x z 1 , z x z 1 for any z = z 1 , z 2 , and
.
by q ∈ ∆(X) and {u(· | x)} x∈X such that for each x ∈ X, we have u(
and
is the set of preferences such that the conditional preference x satisfies z 2 x z 3 x z 1 and z 2 x z 4 x z 1 for all x, and z 2 x z 1 for some x.
3 Preference-Form Games and Preference Rationalizability
A Game in Preference Form
We describe a strategic environment by a combination of a game form (or a mechanism) and what we call a preference structure. Let I be a non-empty finite set of players, and Z be a finite set of outcomes with |Z| ≥ 2, which incorporate both public outcomes and allocations of private outcomes. (To distinguish between public and private outcomes explicitly, we could let Z = Z 0 × i Z i and assume that player i cares only about outcomes in the Z 0 × Z i dimension.)
A game form consists of ((A i ) i∈I , O), where A i is a non-empty finite set of actions available to player i, and O :
is the outcome function. Given this game form, players play an action profile a ∈ A simultaneously, and an outcome z realizes with probability O(z | a). A preference structure consists of (T i , π i ) i∈I , where each player i has a non-empty finite set T i of possible types, T −i = j =i T j , and π i :
, the set of outcomes contingent on the other players' types. We assume that ex-post utility indices belong to a simplex U i = conv{u 1 i , . . . , u
As a special case, if |T i | = 1 for all i ∈ I, then a preference structure specifies a utility index u i ∈ U i (or a preference over lotteries) for each player i. We call a pair of a game form and a preference structure a game in preference form or a preference-form game, and denote it by Γ = (I, Z, (A i , T i , U i , π i ) i∈I , O). 10 10 In Section 3.6, we extend our framework to explicitly incorporate "states" that are relevant for outcomes or preferences.
Equilibria
An equilibrium notion is defined as follows. Let σ i : T i → ∆(A i ) be a behavior strategy of player i. Then each pair of player i's action a i ∈ A i and his opponents' behavior strategies
Preference Rationalizability
In a preference-form game Γ = (I, Z, (A i , T i , U i , π i ) i∈I , O), we define preference rationalizability as follows:
, which is the restriction of i to outcomes that are contingent on T −i but constant along the A −i dimension. 
and the average utility indices
We say that any element in PR i (t i ) is (interim) preference rationalizable for type t i . We also write PR i (t i ; Γ) to emphasize the underlying game Γ.
In words, each type t i of player i rationalizes his action a i by forming a preference i over outcomes contingent on the opponents' actions and types. Condition (i) requires that the preference i responds to outcomes only on the opponents' action-type pairs that have survived in the previous step of iteration. Condition (ii) requires that i is consistent with type t i 's own preference over outcomes contingent on the opponents' types. Condition (iii) requires that a i is optimal given i .
As long as these conditions are satisfied, different players and different types (of the same player)
can have different preferences. Also, even the same type can use different preferences to rationalize different actions.
In this definition, notice that type t i 's utility index and the opponents' actions may be correlated with each other. To understand this correlation, suppose that nature chooses an implicitly defined state, which affects type t i 's utility index, or for short, nature chooses type t i 's utility index. Then we treat the nature as another player, and apply the idea of correlated rationalizability to this environment. This is why we allow for type t i to believe that the opponents' actions and the nature's action are correlated through some channels outside of our explicit model.
We can rewrite the iteration process using a variant of behavior strategies. Namely, type t i rationalizes his action a i by "correlated" behavior strategy σ −i :
is a more permissive notion than a profile (σ j ) j =i of "independent" behavior strategies σ j : T j → ∆(A j ), as it allows for correlation of action profile a −i across the opponents, and is contingent on type profile t −i . Also, utility index v i (· | a −i , t −i ) may depend on the opponents' action-type profile (a −i , t −i ). Thus, from type t i 's perspective, it is as if the opponents observe each other's type t −i and play an action profile a −i in a coordinated manner, and then the nature chooses a utility index for type t i after observing a −i .
The following conditions are also equivalent: there exist "utility-index-contingent" behavior
where
In this expression, σ k −i depends not only on the opponents' type profile t −i , but also player i's own utility index u k i . Thus, we can interpret this expression similarly to the previous one, but along the opposite time line: it is as if the nature chooses a utility index u k i for type t i , and then the opponents of player i play a correlated action profile contingent on the nature's choice.
One can also use duality and define rationalizability by eliminating dominated actions iteratively. Namely, type t i eliminates action a i if there exists
Two comments are in order regarding the (in)dependency of preference rationalizability on utility index restrictions (U i ) i∈I . First, note that sets of preferences, P U i (T −i ) and
are independent of cardinal utility representations, i.e., invariant to positive affine transformations of elements of U i . Thus the set of preference rationalizable actions is also independent of cardinal utility representations.
Second, however, the set of preference rationalizable actions may vary if utility index restrictions are changed in other ways. For example, preference rationalizability becomes more permissive if each U i is expanded to V i ⊇ U i . One might use this fact to argue against preference rationalizability. We, however, think that restrictions (U i ) i∈I are an indispensable aspect of the strategic environment, and our preference-form games allow the modeler to state these restrictions explicitly.
The modeler can take U i as a singleton if she is certain about player i's utility index; otherwise, she should take a relatively large U i to allow for various unmodelled factors that can affect player i's utility indices.
Two Examples
The following two examples illustrate how to construct preference-form games, and how to apply preference rationalizability to these games.
Example 6 (Winner's Curse). The first example is a discretized version of common-value auction, where we discuss winner's curse that arises from correlation between a bidder's valuation and the opponent's bid. Unlike the conventional approach, however, we do not specify such correlation explicitly; instead, we let the solution concept-preference rationalizability-capture various forms of correlation that are implicit in the model. There are two bidders in an action. Each bidder can bid high (action H) or low (L). If both bid low, they get nothing (outcome z 0 ); if bidder i bids high while bidder j = i bids low, then bidder i gets an object and pays a fixed price (z i ); if both bid high, the winner is determined by a fair coin toss. The game form is given by
We impose restrictions on utility indices such that for each bidder i, u i (z 0 ) = u i (z j ) = 0 and
, where v ≥ 1. We consider a simple preference structure, where each bidder i has a single type T i = {t i }, and his preference is represented by u i such that u i (z 0 ) = u i (z j ) = 0 and
It is easy to see that H is preference rationalizable. Then under what condition is L also preference rationalizable? Suppose that bidder i believes that his own valuation is positively correlated with the opponent's bid so that with probability (v + 1)/(2v), "bidder j bids H and
, and with probability (v − 1)/(2v), "bidder j bids L and u i (z i | H) = −v". This belief over j's bids and i's own utility indices represents i's preference, which rationalizes L for bidder i if and only if
i.e., v ≥ 3. In this case, bidder i bids L because he is afraid of suffering from winner's curse when he wins the object. Conversely, if 1 ≤ v < 3, then no correlation structure between bidder i's valuation and the opponent's bid can prevent him from playing H. We interpret this as a trading problem, where players are considering a trade where each player delivers an object-of a known value to him but perhaps an unknown value to the other player-to the other. Thus actions correspond to say yes or no to a proposed trade. Outcome z * corresponds to the full trade taking place, and z 0 corresponds to "no trade". Outcome z i is a situation where player i (who said yes) sends his object but-because the other agent says no-it is destroyed.
Each player i is restricted to have utility indices u i such that
Thus the cost of sending an object is 1, and getting an object from the other player has a value between −v + 1 and v + 1.
Fix a preference type space (T i , π i ) 2 i=1 . We can represent type t i 's preference π i (t i ) by a combination of the probability q i (T j | t i ) of T j ⊆ T j given t i and the expected utility u i (z * | t i , T j ) of z * conditional on t i and T j ⊆ T j . Now we can ask what actions are preference rationalizable for different types. Clearly, N ∈
if v > 1. To see this, in the case of 0 ≤ v ≤ 1, we have Y ∈ PR n+1 i (t i ) if and only if type t i prefers saying yes to no by conjecturing that t j says yes if t j ∈ T n j and no if t j / ∈ T n j . In contrast, in the case of v > 1, we have Y ∈ PR n+1 i (t i ) if and only if type t i prefers saying yes to no by conjecturing that with probability (v + u i (z * | t i , T j ))/(2v), "player j says yes if t j ∈ T n j and no if t j / ∈ T n j , and u i (z * ) = v", and with probability (v − u i (z * | t i , T j ))/(2v), "player j always says no and u i (z * ) = −v". 
Redundant Types
The definition of preference rationalizability respects the "small world" view in the sense that a preference structure is not understood to capture everything in the world. Rather, the modeler admits that there may be always states and types that are implicit in the model but relevant for players' preferences.
As a consequence of this "small world" view, we can show that "enlarging" the model does not affect the set of preference rationalizable actions. More formally, consider two preference structures (T i , π i ) i∈I and (T i ,π i ) i∈I with the same simplex restrictions (U i ) i∈I . We say that a profile (ϕ i ) i∈I of mappings ϕ i : T i →T i is preference-preserving if for any i ∈ I and t i ∈ T i ,
where f • ϕ −i is an act over T −i that assigns a lottery f ((ϕ j (t j )) j =i ) contingent on t −i , and f • ϕ −i is defined similarly. If these preference-preserving mappings are not one-to-one, then we can see a preference-form gameΓ = (I, Z, (A i ,T i , U i ,π i ) i∈I , O) as a "smaller" model than another preference-form game Γ = (I, Z, (A i , T i , U i , π i ) i∈I , O). Proposition 1. If (U i ) i∈I are simplex restrictions and (ϕ i ) i∈I are preference-preserving mappings from (T i , π i ) i∈I to (T i ,π i ) i∈I , then PR i (t i ; Γ) = PR i (ϕ i (t i );Γ) for any i ∈ I and t i ∈ T i .
Proof. By induction, suppose PR n i (t i ; Γ) = PR n i (ϕ i (t i );Γ) for any i ∈ I and t i ∈ T i . Then fix any i ∈ I and t i ∈ T i . For any a i ∈ PR n+1 i (t i ; Γ), there exists i ∈ P U i (A −i × T −i ) such that
Then (i) by the induction hypothesis, we have a −i ∈ PR n −i (t −i ;Γ) whenever (a −i ,t −i ) isˆ i -non-null, (ii) by the definition of preference-preserving mappings, we have mrg T −iˆ i =π i (t i ), and (iii)
Conversely, fix any i ∈ I and t i ∈ T i . Let π i (t i ) be represented by q i (· | t i ) ∈ ∆(T −i ) and
Since ϕ −i preserves player i's preferences π i (t i ) andπ i (ϕ i (t i )) and U i is a simplex, for anyt −i ∈T −i and k = 1, . . . , K i , we havê
For any a i ∈ PR n+1 i (ϕ i (t i );Γ), there existσ
, and (ii ) a i maximizes
by (2) . Thus a i ∈ PR 
Explicit States
We can extend our framework by incorporating states that influence outcomes or preferences. Formally, let Ω be a non-empty finite set of states. An Ω-based game form consists of ((A i ) i∈I , Ω, O)
with O : A × Ω → ∆(Z), and an Ω-based preference structure consists of (T i , π i ) i∈I with π i :
An Ω-based preference-form game is then given by
Note that Ω includes not only states that affect outcomes but also those that affect preferences.
It is necessary to incorporate states that influence outcomes to reflect the modeler's knowledge of the physical structure of the game. In the introduction, we made an argument for not using states that are not known to the players in modelling preference uncertainty. However, we allow for the possibility here, and later show that adding states that affect only preferences does not affect the set of preference rationalizable actions.
Given this preference-form game, we can define preference rationalizability by
In this formulation, the modeler can incorporate as many states as she wishes as long as she knows how these states affect outcomes and players' preferences. However, those states affect the set of preference rationalizable actions only to the extent that they affect outcomes. If states affect only preferences and do not affect outcomes, then since such states are already incorporated implicitly in the solution concept, they do not affect the set of preference rationalizable actions.
More formally, let Γ
preference-form games with uncertainty Ω andΩ, respectively. We say that Ω is redundant inΩ if there exists a mapping ϕ 0 : Ω →Ω such that O(· | a, ω) =Ô(· | a, ϕ 0 (ω)) for any a ∈ A and ω ∈ Ω, and ϕ 0 is preference-preserving, i.e., for any i ∈ I and t i ∈ T i ,
where id T −i is the identity mapping on T −i . Proposition 2. If (U i ) i∈I are simplex restrictions and Ω is redundant inΩ, then PR i (t i ; Γ Ω ) = PR i (t i ; ΓΩ) for any i ∈ I and t i ∈ T i .
Proof. This follows from applying Proposition 1 to the following two games with dummy player 0 (but without uncertainty): in the first game, the dummy player has the set of actions equal to Ω and the set of types equal to Ω, and each type ω ∈ Ω strictly prefers playing action ϕ 0 (ω) ∈ Ω ; in the second game, both the set of actions and the set of types are equal to Ω , and each type ω strictly prefers playing action ω .
Relationship with Payoff-Form Games
In this section, we compare our approach and the conventional one that uses games in payoff form.
The main issue is that for a given preference-form game, one can construct (at least) two different payoff-form games, depending on how we specify payoff-relevant states. We show that rationalizability in one payoff-form game is equivalent to preference rationalizability in the preference-form game, but rationalizability in the other payoff-form game is more restrictive.
A Payoff-Form Game, Equilibria and ICR
Recall that a conventional incomplete-information game is given by G = (I, (A i , Θ 
where Θ i is a non-empty finite set of states that are relevant for player i's payoffs, g i : A×Θ i → R is player i's state-dependent payoff function, and (T i , µ i ) i∈I is an information structure with µ i : T i → ∆(T −i × Θ i ). 11 To emphasize the difference from a game in preference form, we call G a game in payoff form or a payoff-form game.
A profile (σ i ) i∈I of behavior strategies σ i :
Dekel, Fudenberg and Morris (2007) introduce the notion of interim correlated rationalizability (ICR) as follows:
We also write ICR i (t i ; G) to emphasize the underlying game G.
Two Constructions of Payoff-Form Games
Given a game in preference form Γ = (I, Z, (A i , T i , U i , π i ) i∈I , O), there are at least two ways to construct games in payoff form. One way is to set Θ i = T for each player i. In the example discussed in the introduction, where there was a singleton type space, this minimal corresponds to a complete information payoff-form game. For each type t i ∈ T i , whose preference π i (t i ) ∈ P U i (T −i ) is represented by belief q i (· | t i ) ∈ ∆(T −i ) and utility indices {u i (· | t i , t −i )} t −i ∈T −i ⊂ U i , we define 11 Strictly speaking, our definition of incomplete-information games is slightly different from Dekel, Fudenberg and Morris (2007), where they use a single "public" set Θ without subscripts to capture payoff-relevant states to all players.
and his beliefs µ T i :
We denote this payoff-form game by G T .
Another way is to set Θ i = ext U i = {u 1 i , . . . , u K i i } for each player i. This more expansive version corresponded to an incomplete information payoff-form game in the example in the introduction.
Then we define each player's state-dependent payoff function
and his beliefs µ i :
We denote this payoff-form game by G U . At the first glance, both games G T and G U are similar to the preference-form game Γ. In fact, Γ, G T , and G U have the same set of equilibria. Let E(Γ) be the set of equilibria in preference-form game Γ, and E(G) be the set of equilibria in payoff-form game G,
Proof. Note that for each t i ∈ T i , a i ∈ A i , and σ −i = (σ j ) j =i with σ j : T j → ∆(A j ), we have
Thus type t i solves the same maximization problem in G T , G U and Γ.
However, G T and G U may have different sets of ICR actions. In general, ICR in G T is more restrictive than ICR in G U , which is equivalent to preference rationalizability in Γ.
for any i ∈ I and t i ∈ T i .
Proof. For the first part (set inclusion), by induction, suppose ICR n i (t i ; G T ) ⊆ ICR n i (t i ; G U ) for any i ∈ I and t i ∈ T i . Then for each i ∈ I, t i ∈ T i , and a i ∈ ICR n+1 i (t i ; G T ), there exists
, and (iii) a i maximizes
Thus
The second part (set equality) follows from the isomorphisms between ∆(T −i × ext U i ) and
The next example shows that the set inclusion may be strict.
Example 8. Consider the following preference-form game Γ. There are two players I = {1, 2}
and three outcomes Z = {z 1 , z 2 , z 3 }. For each player i, his utility indices are restricted to U i = conv{u 2 , u 3 }, where (u 2 (z 1 ), u 2 (z 2 ), u 2 (z 3 )) = (0, 1, 0) and (u 3 (z 1 ), u 3 (z 2 ), u 3 (z 3 )) = (0, 0, 1). Each player i has only one type T i = {t i }, whose preference is represented by (u i (z 1 ), u i (z 2 ), u i (z 3 )) = (0, 1/2, 1/2). The players play the following game form:
Given such Γ, we define G T as a complete-information game with the following payoffs
It is easy to see that a i is the unique rationalizable action for player i.
On the other hand, G U is an incomplete-information game, where
are given by and each player i believes that θ i = u 2 or u 3 with equal probability. Then player i can rationalize a i by the conjecture ν i ∈ ∆(A j × Θ i ) such that ν i (a j , u 2 ) = ν i (a j , u 3 ) = 1/2. In fact, both a i and a i are ICR actions for player i.
As illustrated by the above example, ICR depends on how we specify state spaces. In game G T , it is (somewhat implicitly) assumed that type profiles capture everything that is relevant for utility indices. That is, conditional on t −i , type t i 's utility index is given by u i (· | t i , t −i ) without any further uncertainty. On the other hand, in game G U , even after type profile (t i , t −i ) is fixed, there may remain uncertainty about type t i 's utility index, which can be correlated with the opponents' actions a −i to the extent that each realization of the utility index belongs to U i , and that the "average" of the utility index is equal to u i (· | t i , t −i ).
A Treatment of Explicit States
Given a preference-form game Γ Ω = (I, Z, Ω, (A i , T i , U i , π i ) i∈I , O) with explicit states Ω, we can define a payoff-form game G U,Ω by setting
,
We can show that ICR in G U,Ω is equivalent to preference rationalizability in Γ Ω .
Proof. Similarly to the second part of Proposition 4, it follows from the isomorphisms between
when U i is a simplex.
Thus, if there is uncertainty in the outcome function, then our approach of using an Ω-based preference-form game is equivalent to using the corresponding payoff-form game with Θ i = ext U i × Ω. The choice of Ω is less problematic than that of Θ i , as the relationship between action profiles and outcomes is more "objective" than players' preferences over outcomes.
A Remark on Singleton Preference Structures
If |T i | = 1 for all i ∈ I, then a preference-form game simply consists of a game form ((A i ) i∈I , O) and each player i's preference over lotteries, represented by a utility index u i ∈ U i . In this case, the corresponding payoff-form game G T is indeed a complete-information game, and ICR is equivalent to correlated rationalizability. On the other hand, the other payoff-form game G U still contains incomplete information (unless in addition to |T i | = 1, we have |U i | = 1 for every i ∈ I). Thus the distinction between complete-and incomplete-information games in payoff form is not obvious and requires some care from the viewpoint of preference-form games.
Non-Simplex Restrictions
We can easily extend the definitions of P U (X), preference-form games and preference rationalizability to cases with non-simplex restrictions (U i ) i∈I by following their definitions almost verbatim. 12 In this section, we discuss whether and how our results extend to such cases.
To simplify our expositions, except when we discuss redundant states in Proposition 6, we assume away explicit states Ω. Extensions to cases with such explicit states are immediate.
Convex Polytope Restrictions
We begin with the slightest deviation from the simplex assumption, and consider cases where each U i is a convex polytope, i.e., a convex hull of finitely many utility indices {u 1 i , . . . , u
(Without loss of generality, we assume that all u k i are extreme points of U i .) For example, the "square" restriction in Example 5 is not a simplex, but a convex polytope.
Then we can show that Propositions 1 and 2 hold in one direction of set inclusion.
Proposition 6. If (U i ) i∈I are convex polytope restrictions and (ϕ i ) i∈I are preference-preserving
Proof. These results follow since the first half of the proof of Proposition 1 does not rely on the simplex assumption.
The following example shows that the other direction of set inclusion does not hold for redundant types (the first half of Proposition 6). A similar counterexample can be constructed for redundant states (the second half).
Example 9. Suppose that I = {1, 2} and Z = {z 1 , z 2 , z 3 , z 4 }. For each k ⊆ {2, 3, 4},
Player 1's utility indices are restricted to the "square" U 1 = conv{u {2} , u {2,3} , u {2,4} , u {2,3,4} }, i.e., U 1 is the set of utility indices u 1 such that u 1 (z 1 ) = 0, u 1 (z 2 ) = 1, and
An exception is one of the equivalent definitions of preference rationalizability that uses utility-index-contingent behavior strategies satisfying (i ) and (ii ), where λ k i (ti, t−i) is not uniquely defined if Ui is not a simplex.
2 has a unique utility index U 2 = {u {2} }. Consider the following game form:
Suppose that in a "smaller" preference structure (T i ,π i ) i=1,2 , each player has one typeT i = {t i }, player 1's preference is represented by the centerū of U 1 such that (ū(z 1 ),ū(z 2 ),ū(z 3 ),ū(z 4 )) = (0, 1, 1/2, 1/2), and player 2's preference is represented by u {2} . In this preference-form gameΓ, all actions are preference rationalizable. To see this, note that player 1 can rationalize a 1 by conjecturing that with probability 1/2, "player 2 plays a 2 and player 1's preference is represented by u {2,3} ", and with the remaining probability, "player 2 plays a 2 and player 1's preference is represented by u {2,4} ". Player 1 can also rationalize a 1 by conjecturing that player 2 plays a 2 for sure. Player 2 is indifferent between a 2 and a 2 . Now consider a "larger" preference-form game Γ with preference structure (T i , π i ) i=1,2 , where T 1 = {t 1 } and T 2 = {t 2 , t 2 }, player 1 believes that with probability 1/2, "player 2's type is t 2 and player 1's preference is represented by u {2} ", and with the remaining probability, "player 2's type is t 2 and player 1's preference is represented by u {2,3,4} ", and player 2's preference is represented by u {2} for both types t 2 and t 2 . Then although ϕ 1 (t 1 ) =t 1 and ϕ 2 (t 2 ) = ϕ 2 (t 2 ) =t 2 are preference-preserving mappings from (
Similarly, without the simplex assumption, the relationship between preference-form games and payoff-form games becomes weak. In particular, given a preference-form game Γ, we cannot uniquely define a payoff-form game G U with Θ i = ext U i . It is because each u i (· | t i , t −i ) can be expressed as a convex combination of ext U i in multiple ways, and hence player i's belief
is not uniquely defined. Nevertheless, Proposition 4 holds in one direction of set inclusion. (The same is true for Proposition 5.)
for any i ∈ I, t i ∈ T i and any specification of G U .
Proof. The first set inclusion follows since the first half of the proof of Proposition 4 does not rely on the simplex assumption. The second set inclusion follows from the (many-to-one) homomorphisms
ICR in G U may be strictly more restrictive than preference rationalizability in Γ for any specification of G U . This is because G U forces us to pick a particular expression of u i (· | t i , t −i ) as a convex combination of ext U i , which imposes a restriction on conjectures that a type can use to rationalize actions. The next example illustrates this point.
Example 10. The following example is an expansion of Example 9. Suppose that I = {1, 2} and
For each k ⊂ {2, 3, 4, 5}, u k denotes the utility index given by u k (z l ) = 0 for l / ∈ k and u k (z l ) = 1 for l ∈ k. Let U 1 = conv{u {2} , u {2,3} , u {2,4} , u {2,3,4} }, i.e., U 1 is the set of utility
Consider the following game form: .
Suppose that each player has one type: player 1's preference is represented by the centerū of
, which is expressed as a convex
is represented by u {5} . In this preference-form game Γ, all actions are preference rationalizability.
To see this, note that player 1 can rationalize a 1 by conjecturing that with probability 1/2, "player 2 plays a 2 and player 1's preference is represented by u {2,3} ", and with the remaining probability, "player 2 plays a 2 and player 1's preference is represented by u {2,4} ". Similarly, player 1 can rationalize a 1 by conjecturing that with probability 1/2, "player 2 plays a 2 and player 1's preference is represented by u {2} ", and with the remaining probability, "player 2 plays a 2 and player 1's preference is represented by u {2,3,4} ". Player 1 can rationalize a 1 by conjecturing that player 2 plays a 2 for sure. Player 2 can rationalize a 2 and a 2 by conjecturing that player 1 plays a 1 for sure.
Also, player 2 can rationalize a 2 by conjecturing that player 1 randomizes between a 1 and a 1 with equal probabilities.
On the other hand, in any corresponding payoff-form game only by conjecturing that player 1 randomizes between a 1 and a 1 , in the second step of iteration, a 2 must be eliminated. Given this, in the third step, both a 1 and a 1 are eliminated.
No Restriction
Now we consider an extreme case where there is no restriction on utility indices. That is, a preference structure is given by (T i , π i ) i∈I with π i : T i → P (T −i ), where P (X) denotes the set of all preferences over F (X) represented by f, f ∈ F (X), f f ⇔ for some w : X × Z → R. 13 In this case, type t i has a preference over F (T −i ) represented bȳ w i : T −i × Z → R, and rationalizes an action by a preference over F (A −i × T −i ) represented by
We argue that if there is no restriction on utility indices, preference rationalizability is oddly behaved. Indeed, the next example illustrates that the set of preference rationalizable actions is not upper hemicontinuous with respect to the outcome function. To see why, note that even Suppose that each player has only one type, who strictly prefers z 2 to z 1 . In this preference-form game, a i is preference rationalizable if and only if p = 1/2. (a i is always preference rationalizable.)
To see this, note that if p = 1/2, then player i forms a preference i ∈ P ({a j , a j }) represented by w i (a j , z 1 ) = w i (a j , z 1 ) = 0, w i (a j , z 2 ) = (1 + p)/(2p − 1) and w i (a j , z 2 ) = (p − 2)/(2p − 1).
Since w i (a j , z 2 ) + w i (a j , z 2 ) > w i (a j , z 1 ) + w i (a j , z 1 ), i is consistent with player i's preference over lotteries. Also, since w i (a j , z 1 ) + pw i (a j , z 1 ) + (1 − p)w i (a j , z 2 ) > pw i (a j , z 1 ) + (1 − p)w i (a j , z 2 ) + w i (a j , z 2 ), player i can rationalize a i .
If p = 1/2, then any preference i ∈ P (A j ) prefers a i to a i if i is consistent with player i's preference over lotteries. It is because w i (a j , z 1 ) + (w i (a j , z 1 ) + w i (a j , z 2 ))/2 < (w i (a j , z 1 ) + w i (a j , z 2 ))/2 + w i (a j , z 2 ) whenever w i (a j , z 2 ) + w i (a j , z 2 ) > w i (a j , z 1 ) + w i (a j , z 1 ).
Also, we can show that the iteration procedure of preference rationalizability always stops in the first step, and hence preference rationalizability for type t i depends only on the restriction of π i (t i ) to lotteries. These results are derived from the following dual characterization. Similarly to Example 11, Part 1 of Proposition 8 depends on the unbounded sensitivity of preferences with respect to other players' actions. For parts 2 and 3 of Proposition 8, it is important that under the no-restriction assumption, all outcomes are "public" in the sense that players care about the entire distribution over Z. These results no longer hold if Z = Z 0 × i Z i , the product of the set Z 0 of public outcomes and the sets Z i of private outcomes, and player i is assumed to care only about the marginal distribution over Z 0 × Z i .
Conclusion
We introduced preference-form games, developed the notion of preference rationalizability, and showed that preference rationalizability is invariant to redundant types and states.
Throughout the paper, we restricted ourselves to the Anscombe-Aumann framework and assumed state-dependent expected utilities. One could extend our framework to the Savage framework or to non-expected-utility preferences, and relax various state independence or monotonicity conditions assumed in Epstein (1997) , Lo (2000) and Chen and Luo (2010) . 14 It is yet to be seen whether such an extension would generate fruitful theoretical results and applications.
